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Identity, Strife, Community/Nation:
A South Asian Perspective
Anil  Sethi
（本 COEフェロー）
　The above-mentioned title refers to a series of ﬁve public lectures delivered by me at 
the Hongo satellite of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo as a C.O.E. Fel-
low of the Centre for Documentation and Area-Transcultural Studies based at the same 
University.
1
  Held in October and November 2003, the lectures were chieﬂy meant for 
doctoral candidates and other advanced students pursuing South Asian Studies and re-
lated disciplines in the various universities of the Tokyo area.  What follows is a note on 
the series as a whole and a brief summary of each of the lectures.
2
  The lectures covered 
a fairly vast ground but in the interests of brevity I have had to condense and synthesize 
enormously.  I can only hope this has not led to a sacriﬁce of nuance.
The series as a whole
　All the ﬁve lectures were primarily concerned with the interrelated issues of commu-
nalism, religious nationalisms, and religious identities in South Asia, the ﬁrst two being 
based on my doctoral research.
3
  The opening one dealt with pollution rituals and Hindu-
Muslim relations in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Punjab while the second 
examined Sikh publicists and the strengthening of the Keshdhari identity during the same 
period.  In this way, these talks sought to cover the three major religious communities 
of the province, my region of study.  The third lecture analyzed issues thrown up by the 
Partition of India historiography, especially by some of the recent writings on the tragic 
division of 1947.  The gruesome Partition violence was communalism or religious na-
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tionalism at its height, so in our fourth meeting we considered, in the light of the earlier 
talks, the vexed historiography of communalism.  It is a commonplace that religious 
nationalism or its cousin, ethnic nationalism, has blighted not just South Asia but many 
other parts of the world as well and that it has been on the rise in recent times.  Focus-
sing on the contemporaneous ascendancy of ethnic nationalisms, the concluding lecture 
sought to inquire into the nature of nationalism.  In that lecture I reminded my audience 
of how the disease of ethnic nationalism has almost made us forget the notion of civic 
nationalism – a concept we need to revisit.
Lecture I
‘Hindu Water, Muslim Water’: Syncretism, Commensality and Community in 
Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Punjab
The lecture began with an explanation of the heuristic category ‘communalism’ and 
other cognate terms as also with a historiographic contextualization of the day’s subject 
by introducing the audience to the problem for analysis.  It was pointed out that the 
historiography of South Asian communalism is now very vast, and although the last 
decade has seen some work on the interplay between the symbolic and cultural aspects 
of religion and the creation of communal identities, much more needs to be done.  Until 
the 1990s, historians of communalism had investigated high politics, the constitutional 
arrangements of the British Raj and, more often than not, they had sought to explain 
communal violence in terms of political machinations (resulting, say, from the establish-
ment of separate electorates in 1909) and socio-economic tensions of one sort or another 
(competition for government jobs or the symmetry of economic class and religious com-
munity as in East Bengal or Malabar).  While these researches are insightful, causes such 
as separate electorates and competition for government jobs seem to be too minor for the 
effects to be explained.  As Professor Satish Saberwal put it, ‘A certain matching of mag-
nitudes between causes and effects seems to be warranted.  If the historian’s ﬁne sense of 
causation takes him to the spark that lights the tinder, the sociologist’s gross sense draws 
him to the tinder instead; both are necessary for the ﬁre to start’.
4
Of course, a lot of water has flown down our rivers since Saberwal made that state-
ment.  The last decade has seen some interesting work by Tanika Sarkar, Pradip Kumar 
Datta and Charu Gupta on the formation of communal ideologies.
5
  The work of these 
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younger scholars, however, has largely focused on religious and communal discourses 
to the relative neglect of the ebb and ﬂow of everyday life.  In exploring the tinder of 
communalism, I argued for an analysis of daily social practices as well, many of which 
have their roots in religion.  So, the problem for analysis lies in exploring how communal 
mentalities are inﬂuenced by sectarian discourses, the institutional webs within which 
such discourses are located, and the routine practices of society.
Many aspects of social relationships – rituals, rites of passage, myths, notions of the 
past, material culture, symbolic exclusions – may be used by publicists to construct 
boundaries between religious groups in daily life.  A glaring entry-point into such bound-
ary formation for the Punjab up to the mid-twentieth century (as indeed for almost all 
of South Asia in the pre-1950 period) is provided by questions of purity and pollution, 
commensality and segregation as a number of Hindus and Sikhs observed these vis-à-
vis Muslims.  Attitudes concerning pollution taboos, although integral to the life of the 
Punjabis, existed among them in an amorphous subconscious form and did not imply any 
constant solidarity around religious and cultural issues.  Nonetheless, they contributed 
to the formation of stereotypes of the collective Self and the collective Other and often 
became an important ingredient of identities perceived in, and through, daily occurrences 
and relationships.  I showed how pamphleteers and publicists used this situation to dis-
course about pollution observances and the formation of a sense of religious community.
In order to demonstrate that there is a question at issue we must, however, ﬁrst recognize 
the existence of a strong sense of shared culture in nineteenth century Punjab.  Symbiotic 
activities were marked by considerable variety and had many loci.  They arose from 
political considerations, the need of any state system to attract and incorporate diverse 
talent and legitimize itself across different social groups.  They were fostered by the 
existence of a language-of-state, by common educational experiences and by the mobile 
warrior groups of the eighteenth century.  Equally they arose from popular culture: the 
sharing of ritual, belief, practice and festivals.  Yet, this sharing and the resulting fuzzy 
identities had certain limits.  Despite all their expediency, the Sikh rulers desired to estab-
lish themselves as the protectors and benefactors of Sikhism.  They banned cow slaughter 
in the holy city of Amritsar.  The Qazi’s ofﬁce at Lahore may have been retained but the 
state usurped the city’s Badshahi Masjid  -- one of the most signiﬁcant mosques in all 
north India -- disallowed prayers there, and turned it into a magazine, a function it served 
until 1850 when the British restored it to the Muslims.  These were matters of royal 
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legitimation and of the assertion of sovereignty.  Even so the use of religious idioms 
in monarchical ritual and of religious groupings in building support structures could 
produce conflicts over sacred places and fracture the notion of a shared culture.  The 
example of the mixed religious routines of the Khatris was also offered to show how the 
orthopraxy of Hinduism restrained and contextualized their eclecticism.  Issues of power 
and sovereignty, of social practice and theology, helped create a shared culture but also 
contributed to limiting symbiotic experiences.  Hence, fractures in this shared culture 
could always creep in.
6
Turning to the notions of ritual purity and pollution, the codes of commensality and 
segregation usually practised by various Hindu and Sikh groups vis-` a-vis Muslims (rather 
than the other way round), I focused on their extensive pervasion and on how they were 
employed to organize a great deal of social interaction.  I attempted to construct the mi-
lieu within which the taboos were construed by various people to signify, represent, or at 
times even identify Hindus and Muslims in their daily lives showing exactly which caste 
and class groups observed pollution taboos, in which contexts, and of what kind.
7
  
Did pollution observances encapsulate a boundary between the protagonist and those 
segregated?  Not necessarily, because the separation involved therein may have been very 
passive or feeble for it to carry much meaning for the actor who would have followed a 
set of norms into which she/he had been socialised, merely out of habit or custom.  Since 
a boundary hinges on perception it may be understood in rather different terms, not only 
by people ascribed externally to its opposite sides, but also by people ascribed similarly 
to the same side.  The assumption that the outward forms of culture ‘express’ or ‘reﬂect’ 
some deeper inward reality is too reductionist.  The way out of such determinism lies in 
analysing the weight that individuals and groups among the various religious communi-
ties accorded to codes of ritual purity and commensality and what they made of them.
Finally, moving to the ‘inner history’ of how the experience of pollution taboos was 
interpreted in discourse or action by certain people in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Punjab, I undertook a detailed examination of a tract published from Amritsar in 
1913.  Entitled Chhut-Chhat (Pollution), this tract was jointly edited by a Hindu convert, 
a bookseller and a shopkeeper and commission agent.
8
  Four other writers contributed 
to it while it also incorporated the queries and responses of people in regular correspon-
dence with the editors.  Addressed apparently to the Muslims of north India, it sought 
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to represent their apathy but also their indignation at the manner in which the Hindus 
humiliatingly treated them.  Simultaneously it spoke from the vantage point of a weak 
petty-bourgeoisie linked as it often was to local journalists and priests, the major essays 
coming from members of these groups.  It is impossible to work out the circulation 
ﬁgures of the tract, yet its importance lies in offering us an insight into how its writers 
deployed the experience of segregation and its symbols to deﬁne their notions of com-
munity.
It is often believed that rituals of purity were written into daily routines with such 
monotonous regularity that people did not construct boundaries around them, that they 
were viewed simply as idiosyncrasies or as matters of faith to which everybody had a 
right.  But to say, on the other hand, that they were perceived as insults during our period 
of study is not to be anachronistic.  They could rankle as the pamphlet so powerfully 
conveys, not only with the Muslims, but with some Hindus too.  
But is it valid to characterize this tract as a communal document?  In answering this 
question, I reminded the audience of the heuristic deﬁnitions of communal/communalism 
and community identity, activated and latent, that he had mentioned in the beginning. 
The play of the rules of ritual purity and pollution can be understood at many levels. 
First, they were mental habits acquired in early childhood (that is during a period of 
primary socialization), a part of an unthinking routine, enacted unconsciously or sub-
consciously.  As automatisms they structured thought and action but did not necessarily 
entail a perception of cultural watersheds. Second, these internalized principles could 
also offer – especially to those who regularly suffered the concomitant humiliations – 
a powerful potential context for forging an activated sectarian identity.  Third, a sharp 
antagonism between the two communities could be written into the created identities, 
and in so far as these publicists did this, the pamphlet is a communal text.  They viewed 
the broader issues of communal rivalry and politics through the prisms of their lives, im-
bricating the two in order to promote a communal ideology.  They were the authors and 
propagandists of such constructions, but could also well be its witnesses and products.
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My second lecture concerned one of India’s most robust, visible and mobile communities 
whose members can be found in the remotest parts of our planet.  Yet, very few non-
Sikhs have shown even a passing interest in Sikh history and religion.  Apparently, just 
a couple of Japanese scholars study Sikhism, so there is a vast and exciting ﬁeld here 
crying for attention.
I began by introducing a largely unfamiliar audience to certain key Sikh categories such 
as Sahajdhari, Sanatan Sikhism, Keshdhari, and the Tat Khalsa.  From the establishment 
of the Khalsa in 1699 to the 1890s, for almost two centuries, the Keshdharis and the 
Sahajdharis vied for control over Sikhism, with the latter remaining powerful, if not 
dominant, for most of that period.  Only after the mid-1870s, did the Keshdharis, led by 
the Singh Sabha ‘reformers’ surge ahead.  Much of the lecture was about how the Keshd-
hari identity became the paramount Sikh identity by the early twentieth century and how 
Sikh history was suitably interpreted by Khalsa ideologues to this purpose.
In contradistinction to the Keshdhari and Tat Khalsa identities stand the Sahajdhari 
and Sanatan Sikh perspectives, much weaker today than ever before.  Sahajdharis are 
non-Khalsa Sikhs, the term deriving from sahaj: slow, easy, natural.  The word sahaj de-
scribes the condition of ultimate, inexpressible beatitude, the condition of ineffable bliss 
resulting from the practice of nam simran.  Fairly inﬂuential up to the early decades of 
the twentieth century, the Sahajdharis produced a conservative but polysemic, pluralistic 
tradition that situates the teachings of the Sikh Gurus in the wider popular religion of late 
medieval Punjab and assumes its ideas to be age-old.  This was Sanatan Sikhism.  Conse-
quently, the tradition venerates gods and goddesses that would be labeled ‘Hindu’ today, 
especially the soteriological aspects of the divine feminine or the devi of the Shaktas. 
It treats the caste system and its taboos as integral to the Sikh faith and regards the Adi 
Granth and the devi-venerating Dasam Granth, a composition attributed to Guru Gobind, 
at par.
9
A few other heuristic issues were dwelt upon before moving to the period 1880-1920. 
Lecture II
Serving the Panth: Sikh Publicists and the Sikh Past, c. 1880-1920
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The term panth was explained in contradistinction to dharma and qaum as referring 
to any given system of religious belief or practice as also to a community observing 
a particular system of belief or practice.  It was not without reason that I chose to use 
the expression ‘publicists’ over ‘reformers’ or ‘revivalists’.  With the rejection of the 
old-fashioned ‘modernization theory’ paradigms, historians have realized that ‘social re-
form’, prescriptive by deﬁnition, did not entail universal improvement or progress.  What 
was perceived as ‘betterment’ by some may not have been so for others.  Furthermore, 
‘reform’ efforts were often deliberately limiting, linked as they were to the interests of 
those advocating them.  Space does not permit any elaborate elucidation of how and why 
various reformist dissertations were fraught with the inequalities of their own making, 
something that I had explained at length in the lecture.  As is well known political and 
other hegemonic agendas were implicated in questions of social reform.
There are problems with the term ‘revivalist’ too.  A revived use of an old custom or 
practice means that tradition is being constructed anew.  Then what really is being 
revived?  As has been shown various ‘traditions’ may be developed for or adapted to the 
demands of a new situation in order to attract people towards certain forms of identity 
even where certain aspects of collective mentalities may be inherited from the past.
10
  It 
should be apparent that much of what goes by the label ‘revival’ is an attempt to refor-
mulate tradition for purposes of propagating a certain cause.  It follows, therefore, that 
‘reformers’ and ‘revivalists’ were often no more than publicists, propagandists of a cause 
and in the case of India at the turn of the last century, puriﬁers of religious traditions that 
had hitherto been shared and mixed.
One of the salient developments in Sikhism since the British annexation of the Punjab 
was the founding of the Singh Sabha (Singh Society) in Amritsar in 1873.  A ‘reform’ so-
ciety, whose radical Lahore wing successfully persuaded it to accept the Khalsa tradition 
as standard, the Sabha sought to establish Tat Khalsa (the ‘True Khalsa’) ideals within 
the Panth.  Bhai Vir Singh (1872-1957) was one among a galaxy of intellectuals and 
reformers who persevered to promote this vision.  
A thorough knowledge of the Guru period and of the later classics stood Vir Singh in 
good stead as he set out to contribute to the Sabha’s historiography.  But his career 
as a prolific and versatile publicist who put print to good use was also shaped by his 
exposure to Christian missionary methods and forms of organization.  In 1894 Vir Singh 
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established the Khalsa Tract Society, visualized along similar lines as the Christian North 
Indian Tract and Book Society.  By l911, the Society had published about four hundred 
tracts exceeding a million copies on Sikh history and scriptures, right conduct, the ideal 
woman, the purging of superstition and the Punjabi language.  Of his vast journalistic, 
literary and theological output, his didactic novels, written to avert the putative degenera-
tion of Sikhs resulting from their ‘ignorance’ of a ‘glorious’ past, were the chief focus 
of my lecture.  In stories such as Sundari (published 1898), Bhai Vir Singh created ideal 
characters that overcome great ordeals and display an unswerving morality, thus contrib-
uting to the Khalsa ideal of a tightly-knit, vibrant community.
11
  
Sundari is set in the strife-torn eighteenth century with the Khalsa Sikhs pitted against 
Mughal and Afghan might.  It narrates the tale of a woman, at ﬁrst Hindu, rescued by 
her Keshdhari brother from the clutches of a Muslim notable who kidnapped her when 
she was about to leave for her husband’s home after her marriage.  The woman escapes, 
joins a Khalsa militia, undergoes amrit baptism, is renamed Sundari, and serves her male 
comrades through their manifold trials and tribulations.  
Sundari identiﬁes the ‘vicious’ Mughals and Afghans as the Sikhs’ adversaries.  Its plot 
centres on abductions, attempted conversions, incessant violence and torture perpetrated 
by the ‘Turks’, and the untold sacriﬁces of a committed Khalsa.  Vir Singh was careful 
enough to create a somewhat complicated story in which Hindus like Lakhpat Rai, the 
diwan of Lahore, or the hill rajas are placed in the Mughal camp.  He was keen to stress 
that Khalsa opposition to Delhi resulted from the rulers’ injustice, not from any religious 
primordiality.  Yet the structure, content, and message of the stories is such that the 
categories Afghan/Mughal and the Muslims may get conﬂated in the readers’ conscious-
ness.  The oppressors may be (Muslim) rulers or their vassals, but almost always the 
oppressed are Hindus/Sikhs in general.  Usually portrayed as indubitable, the function of 
such writings was inspirational.  These constructs about the past were seldom contingent 
or empirically veriﬁable.  Viewed as identity-markers in the politico-cultural disputations 
of the late nineteenth century, they were assiduously used by publicists to create sectarian 
distinctiveness.
The Hindu/Sikh attitude to Muslims and the pollution practices of the former had 
engaged our attention in the ﬁrst seminar.  As we have seen, it was Vir Singh’s express 
purpose to promote cohesion and solidarity within the Panth.  Consequently, in line with 
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Tat Khalsa thinking, he repudiated caste and encouraged commensality and matrimony 
across the jatis.  However, Vir Singh’s opposition to the taboos stopped there.  At a 
number of places in Sundari, the author shows Sikhs rejecting food from Muslims.  He 
does not recommend or justify this explicitly.  But he does not denounce it either, not 
even indirectly.  Ritual pollution is sometimes used in the text as a device to maintain the 
‘purity’ of one’s own community or to emphasize the alien or the antagonist in a tyranni-
cal opponent.  
It was Vir Singh’s brief to help create a distinct ritual and social space for the Sikhs.  In 
Sundari he dwelt on this subject extensively, introducing his readers to the intricacies and 
the signiﬁcance of Sikh religious routines and rites de passage.  Vir Singh also believed 
that it was the Singh Sabha’s task to prepare able and chaste women for the Panth. 
Historians have shown how the nineteenth century middle-class intelligentsia introduced 
persuasive new models of female respectability into reformist discourse.
12
  Under Vir 
Singh’s stewardship, the Khalsa Tract Society authored pamphlets that instructed women 
in enlightened child care, dress codes, observance of the rahit, the Sikh rites de passage, 
the urgency of giving up ‘Hindu’ practices such as the observance of manifold fasts, 
family education and conjugality.  Although Sundari remains unmarried, she practices 
some of these ideals, cooking for the militia, taking charge of their ‘domestic’ needs and 
nursing the wounded during battle.  For the novel’s author she was wedded to the Panth. 
It is in this capacity alone that she participates in the ‘public sphere’, contributing to the 
struggle ‘for the defence of morality and religion’.  It was Vir Singh’s concern that the 
Panth should produce dutiful and chaste women who in turn would invigorate the com-
munity.  Therefore, as with other communities, for the Singh Sabha too, women became 
an index of the moral health of the ‘tradition’ itself.
In concluding the lecture, I compared the Singh Sabha’s perspective, as we gather it from 
Bhai Vir Singh’s writings, with that of the Sau Sakhian (A Hundred Anecdotes), a rahit-
nama composed sometime between 1834 and 1845.
13
  The Sau Sakhian is a bricolage 
of the distinctive features of the Khalsa, Sanatan Sikhism, and other popular beliefs of 
the age even as it rejected certain aspects of the last two.  Consequently the Sau Sakhian 
portrays a tradition where boundaries between the Khalsa and others are constructed and 
destroyed all the time while Vir Singh’s didactic ﬁction seeks to draw them so ﬁrmly as 
to leave the Khlasa with an indelible identity and to promote it as the standard paradigm 
of Sikhism.
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A product of my teaching at the undergraduate and the postgraduate levels, nonetheless, 
this lecture was culled from both primary and secondary materials.  I have, however, just 
begun to research the subject as well.
14
I began the talk by placing my interest as a child of the tragic division of 1947 in per-
spective.  Had the Partition not occurred, (and it was by no means inevitable until the 
summer of 1946), in all probability my parents, ‘refugees’ from West Punjab, would have 
never met each other.  And that means I would have simply not been there.  The Partition 
changed the course of many lives dramatically and in various ways: they were snuffed 
out, cities changed, India changed, a new country was born, and there was unprecedented 
genocidal violence and migration.
Sharing a few experiences of circa 1947 with the audience, narrated to me in the winter 
of 1992-93 at Lahore, I pointed to the all-pervasive savagery of the times.  Several 
hundred thousand were estimated to have been killed during Partition, unaccountable 
numbers raped and assaulted and many millions uprooted and thrown into alien lands. 
These homeless people had suddenly lost all their immovable property and most of their 
movable assets, many of their relatives and friends as well, torn asunder from their moor-
ings, from their houses, ﬁelds and fortunes, from their childhood memories and friends, 
and thus stripped of their local or regional cultures, forced to begin picking up life from 
scratch.  
Historians have asked whether the term Partition, signifying a constitutional division, 
aptly describes this situation or whether other categories such as a sixteen-months’ 
civil war or holocaust are more appropriate.
15
  The latter captures the gravity of what 
happened in the subcontinent at this time and helps to focus on issues pertaining to the 
relationship between memory and history, all the ‘momentous marker’ questions, similar 
to the ones raised regarding the European Holocaust.  Yet, differences between the two 
events should not be overlooked.  In 1947-48, the subcontinent did not bear witness 
to any state-driven extermination as was the case with Nazi Germany where various 
Lecture III
A Momentous Marker: the Partition of India Revisited
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modern techniques of control and organization had been used.  Furthermore, the Partition 
of India saw ‘ethnic cleansing’ of a ‘communitarian’ rather than a state-sponsored type, 
implemented through a combination of modern and traditional methods.
16
The first half of the talk was devoted to an explanation of why the Partition has been 
such a momentous marker.  I used oral narratives to demonstrate the enormous impact of 
Partition on personal lives – a living impact that still holds sway – and to explain the 
salience of ascribed identities in South Asia.  The Partition has got implicated, moreover, 
with the production in India of the stereotype that Muslims nurture extra-territorial 
loyalties and other highly objectionable binaries with similar mirror-images proliferating 
in Pakistan.
17
  Every myth in these constructions has been systematically exposed by 
historians.  But in both countries the religious Right will not relent.
In the half century since the Partition, India and Pakistan have been to war three times, 
if Kargil is not to be counted as one.  One of these marked the killing of Muslims by 
Muslims and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971-72.  The 1990s ‘witnessed the rise 
of Hindu majoritarian nationalism in India, the resurgence of Hindu-Muslim violence in 
the north and west of the country, the recurrence of centre-region problems in nearly all 
of South Asia, the repression of a popularly backed armed insurgency in Kashmir, and 
the ravages of an array of violent conflicts in Pakistan, involving, in particular, Urdu-
speaking migrants from India’.
18
  Clearly then, the legacy of 1947 must be understood in 
all these contexts.
The latter half of the lecture was taken up by two of the most significant aspects of 
Partition historiography: why and how the Partition happened and the tumultuous experi-
ences of ordinary people during the period 1946-55.  I argued why it would be incorrect 
to locate the seeds of Partition in communal developments of the period prior to the 
mid-1930s.  As the protagonist of the ﬁlm Garm Hava (Hot Winds) puts it, ‘communal 
discord happened even before 1947 but it had never led to the uprooting of millions from 
their homes’.
19
  
The Partition was a qualitatively different phenomenon from earlier communal politics 
and its genesis lay in just the last decade of British rule.  Consequently, considerable 
attention was devoted to various events and policies of this era, the tortuous negotia-
tions between the British, the Muslim League and the Congress, the strengthening of 
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the Hindu Right in the ’40s, the bhadralok Bengali demand in 1947 for the division of 
their province
20
, and the Congress vote for splitting Punjab into Muslim-majority and 
Sikh-majority halves the same year.  The suddenness of the Partition was stressed and it 
was shown how other options faded away only after the failure of the Cabinet Mission 
in the summer of ’46 and the appalling rioting that occurred in the wake of the Muslim 
League’s observance of Direct Action on 16 August 1946.
One of the main reasons for the continuity of the mass massacres for well over a year 
from March ’47 onwards was the prevailing political anarchy.  The British were leaving 
India for good but simultaneously they withdrew from society most of the law and order 
apparatus.  This is the view of not just Indian and Pakistani historians, but of contem-
porary British civil servants such as Penderel Moon as well.
21
  To be fair to the British, 
their problems were compounded because Indian soldiers and policemen had turned into 
Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs in uniform.  In times of extreme communal tension such as 
this, their professional commitment could not be relied upon.  But when the rulers them-
selves were indifferent to the existing situation, how could they be expected to enforce 
law and order and that too impartially?  If they did so, who would appreciate or reward 
their services?  Certainly not the British, who were about to leave the country, still less 
the Muslim Leaguers or the Hindu-minded among Congressmen, and it was these parties 
that were about to inherit the Raj.
22
Amidst all this turmoil, one man’s valiant, almost lonesome efforts at restoring commu-
nal harmony bore some fruit.  Mountbatten’s one-man army, the seventy-seven year old 
Gandhi, ‘decided to stake his all in a bid to vindicate his life-long principles of change 
of heart and non-violence in the villages of Noakhali, followed by Bihar and then the 
riot-torn slums of Calcutta and Delhi’.
23
  Gyanendra Pandey’s poignant portrayal of the 
Mahatma’s stupendous striving to afﬁrm India’s multiculturalism at this crucial juncture 
was discussed.  As Pandey put it, Gandhi’s bodily sacriﬁce in the public sphere and his 
refusal to give consent to Hindu nationalism or ethnic cleansing ‘changed the nature of 
sociality at the local level’.
24
  
I went on to emphasize how and why Partition historiography has moved away from ex-
amining the high politics of negotiations over Independence to examining the experienc-
es of ordinary people during that fateful period.  The work of Butalia, Menon and Bhasin, 
and Pandey, among others, has recovered the plight of women in these trying times and 
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how deeply they were affected.
25
  Women were raped, abducted, sold, often many times 
over, forced to settle down to a new life with strangers in unknown circumstances.  Just 
as they were developing new bonds, the Indian and Pakistani governments, insensitive to 
the complexities of human relationships, and therefore believing the women to be on the 
wrong side of the border, tore them from their new relatives, sending them to their earlier 
families or locations.  This was how the otherwise warring Indian and Pakistani states 
had colluded to deﬁne nationality: in terms of ascribed identities, a result of administra-
tive convenience and their notions of masculinity that men ‘own’ women.  
Butalia and others have also demonstrated how ideas of preserving community honour, 
seen as ‘protecting’ one’s women from violation by the Other, came into play in this 
period of extreme physical and psychological danger.  This was nothing but a conception 
of masculinity deﬁned as ownership of zan (women) and zamin (land), a notion of con-
siderable age in north Indian peasant societies.  Virility, it was believed, lay in the ability 
to ‘protect’ your ‘possessions’ – zan and zamin – from ravaging hordes.  Often enough, 
the women were made to internalize the same masculine values.  Thus, women became 
the site for the preservation of the community’s ‘honour’, the site for the very construc-
tion of the community as a ‘valorous’, might we say, ‘manly’ one.
I concluded by pointing out some of the under-researched themes of the subject under 
review.  We now realize that Partition violence (like most other sectarian violence) was 
not spontaneous but organized.  We know that local off-shoots or associates of the R.S.S., 
Akali Dal and the Muslim League planned and inﬂicted mass violence but there is, as 
yet, very little systematic research on the issue.  Unless we conduct this research we shall 
fail to account for the ferocious brutalities of the period.  Other themes too are being 
taken up by scholars – the question of rehabilitation, the process and its economic and 
cultural impact on both localities and entire provinces, the issue of differences in migra-
tion patterns between the Punjab, Bihar-Bengal and Karachi/Sindh, and the life of the mi-
grants in their new settings, a subject on which Professor Hiroshi Sato has been working. 
Last but not the least, buried under the debris of this catastrophe, is an enormous history 
of help, humanity and harmony as our on-going interviews in Delhi and Ashis Nandy’s 
recent project reveal.
26
  We have to listen to and record these testimonies just as we have 
to record the history of resistance to communalism, racism and genocide.
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This lecture, building on themes previously introduced, examined the complicated 
historiography of communalism.  I began by focusing again on the heuristic categories 
of ‘communalism’, ‘activated religious identity’ and ‘latent religious identity’ and on 
other related terms such as Ayesha Jalal’s ‘the politics of cultural nationalism’ and ‘a 
religiously informed cultural identity’ 
27
, guarding the audience against conﬂating these. 
I emphasized that as a concept communalism requires a more systematic deconstruction 
and periodization than has hitherto been attempted.  Any attempt to deﬁne it must posit 
antagonism between religious communities as the chief feature of the concept.  Finally, 
reminding the audience that communities should not be treated as bounded entities, I 
drew their attention to the peculiar usage of the word ‘communal’ and its corresponding 
noun in South Asia.
A vast scholarly literature exists on communalism and a number of approaches have been 
developed to study the phenomenon.  How does one go about making sense of these 
‘models’ and how can we correlate them?  One of the ways of doing so, I suggested, is 
to plot explanations of communalism on an axis moving from primordiality to instru-
mentality.  Put another way, the axis can run from religiosity to materiality, with the most 
nuanced writers demonstrating the interplay of diverse ideational and material factors in 
its making.
28
Only a few scholars see communalism as a primeval identity.  Many more have pointed 
to the numerous instrumentalities that have gone into the shaping of this explosive ideol-
ogy.  Instrumentalist models have their strengths but they fail to analyze the ideational 
making of religious/sectarian mentalities, the meaning and motivation that community 
symbols, myths and legends hold for various people.  They cannot elucidate, quite sim-
ply, why and how any ideology, confessional, sacred or some other is fervently adhered 
to beyond the pull of self-interest.
29
  On the other hand the primordialist position, ignor-
ing historical contingency, tends to reify religious identities and objectifies culture as 
heritage.  It marginalizes the force of circumstances and effaces context and historicity.
30
Lecture IV
The Tinder and the Spark: the Vexed Historiography of Communalism
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Until the 1990s, most writings on South Asia tended to explain communal antagonisms 
in predominantly political and/or economic terms, deriving the logic of mentalities from 
‘hard-headed tangible rationality’ alone.  Many scholars wrote about power-hungry elites 
manipulating the religious sensibilities of the people to further their own interests.
31
  
More nuanced writers suggested how communal violence resulted from the interplay of 
claims to honour, status, power, and leadership roles.
32
  Yet others sought to demonstrate 
that sectarian tensions were distorted expressions of the symmetry of class and religious 
community in particular regions.
33
  Fashionable theories of the dominance of a ‘colonial 
discourse’ have refurbished the old nationalist perspective of British divide-and-rule 
strategies, thus substituting the structural with the conspiratorial.
34
  In this argument 
western taxonomies (imposed via census operations, for instance) are held responsible 
for the division of Indian society into distinct, often mutually opposed blocks of religion, 
tribe or caste.
35
The signiﬁcance of these perspectives in explaining speciﬁc aspects of sectarian politics 
cannot be overlooked, yet one must ask, how and why do political manipulations suc-
ceed?  How can the impact of colonial discourse on Indian mentalities be estimated? 
Furthermore, it needs to be underscored that an uncritical application of the Saidian 
framework can rob Indian groups of initiative and agency.
36
  Nor will it do to treat com-
munal ideas or community boundaries as surrogates for material grievances.  Concepts 
of structural strain do not in themselves explain the ‘attachment that peoples feel for 
the inventions of their imaginations’.
37
  They do not provide an analysis of ideology in 
terms of what it means to participants, of the codified symbolic forms it assumes for 
them.  While researches stressing structural and material factors for the emergence of 
communalism are insightful, it seems to me as it did to Satish Saberwal that causes such 
as separate electorates and competition for government jobs are too minor to explain the 
rise and growth of communal politics, a point emphasized in the ﬁrst lecture.  
38
It would be incorrect to overlook insights along these lines from within the discipline 
of history.  Investigating the cultural sense of religious community through the concept 
of ‘public arena’, Sandria Freitag succeeded in introducing mentality-variables into the 
analysis. 
39
  But it may still be asked whether popular culture activities had the potential 
to create identities and sow the seeds of community antagonisms?
40
  The rapid rise of 
Hindutva in the 1990s compelled scholars to explore the linkages between religiosity 
and the formation of sectarian mentalities – for both the contemporary and the colonial 
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periods.  Pradip Datta examines how upper-caste ideologues, combining with the Raja-
bansis, carved a Hindu bloc in inter-war Bengal using various resources: history, litera-
ture, religion, ritual and the logic of events themselves.
41
  He speaks of the articulation of 
a Hindu communal ‘common sense’ in the 1920s, its classic instance being the campaign 
that Hindu women were being regularly abducted by Muslim hoodlums.  Traversing a 
range of issues of the past two centuries – domesticity, conjugality, religion, law, Ben-
gali literature and the Hindutva movement – Tanika Sarkar has similarly investigated the 
making of a Hindu cultural nationalism in Bengal and northern India.
42
  In an article on 
the impact of the recorded voice of Sadhvi Rithambhara, a young sanyasin of the Sangh 
combine, Sarkar explores how the cognitive categories and practices of religion are used 
in the service of sectarian agendas. 
43
  She elucidates how Bankim Chandra’s hymn, 
Vande Mataram, notions of deshbhakti (devotion to one’s country) and Rambhakti have 
been used by Hindu nationalists in their audio and video cassettes to reify and mystify 
the conception of ‘country’ and how Rithambhara’s lethal communalism seeks to paint ‘a 
long history of past mutilations and desecrations of an inviolable sacred body’.
44
All these writings have sought to explore the linkages between religiosity, public cer-
emonial and the formation of communal mentalities.  However, as I seek to demonstrate 
in my work, any analysis of the latter must take not only collective cultural activities and 
the formation and dissemination of sectarian ideologies into account but also the routine 
interactions of every day life.
45
  Depending on locale, circumstance and time-period this 
might involve many different institutions and practices of ‘socialization’ – the family, 
educational institutions, common patterns of work, ritual exclusions, temple and shrine 
and various voluntary associations.
If we are to focus on daily life, it can be said that in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century Punjab, the observance of pollution rituals by a number of Hindu castes vis-à-
vis different Muslim groups provided a constant and a powerful potential context for the 
construction of community boundaries – as my analysis of the topic had suggested ear-
lier in this series.  Even so this ubiquity had no necessary implications for the emergence 
of communal consciousness or even for the construction of community distinctions.  For 
some people the taboos did not represent any notion of sectarian boundaries.  For others, 
such as the pamphleteers and publicists whose texts I have examined, these regulations 
(and related deprecatory constructs) provided a very effective means of distinguishing 
between the two communities and of preaching mutual hostility.  At the turn of the 
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twentieth century, these observances had begun to rankle with Muslims while many non-
Muslims too had begun to think of them with a degree of guilt as insulting to Muslims. 
Owing to a host of mid-century changes, not least the rise of new notions of equality, 
rationality and bourgeois civility
46
, these perspectives denoted a marked alteration from 
the earlier perceptions of tolerance arising from the view that the taboos are an expres-
sion of differences in food habits and life-styles.  It is indeed surprising that this critical 
dimension of Hindu-Muslim relations in India has been ignored by scholarly studies.  
Sectarian rhetoric and practice about commensality was, of course, only one of the 
ingredients in the making of self-conscious community identities.  A similar role was 
performed by numerous other ‘reformist’ formulations.  Self-styled moralizers of this 
period attempted to purge the province’s popular religious traditions of their ﬂuidity and 
diversity.  Believing in theological boundedness or what may be called purism, these 
ideologues circulated community histories, prescriptions about the ‘public’ conduct of 
women, denunciations of Suﬁ saints, and didactic statements about life-cycle rituals and 
festivals.  Often reformist propaganda intermeshed many of these themes and related 
them to various symbolic and material concerns.  In this way, it introduced new fractures 
into a culture which, despite previous fissures, had remained considerably mixed and 
shared.  This issue connects with my arguments about Sikh publicists and Bhai Vir Singh 
that I had advanced in the second lecture as well as with the work of Charu Gupta who 
has examined the centrality of gender to the creation of a sexualized and communalized 
Hindu identity in colonial U.P.  Gupta shows how reforms, ‘often synonymous with regu-
lation’, introduced mechanisms of surveillance ‘imbued with new meanings via reworked 
codes of conjugality, law, clothes, hygiene and health’.
47
It is not my argument that the above-mentioned processes produced communal politics 
by themselves.  That resulted from larger, more complex, conjunctures which began 
emerging in a concerted way in the post-Rebellion period.  These conjunctures were 
themselves the result of the interplay of many diverse factors quite familiar to historians. 
However, the contention is that boundaries perceived by publicists, puriﬁers and ordinary 
people and the meanings attached to them were prisms through which larger communal 
questions were viewed.  To put this in another manner, they provided symbolic tools for 
communal mobilization.  Therefore, in focusing on these themes we are not looking for 
the causes of the emergence of communalism.  We are unravelling the means with which 
communal ideas were internalized and expressed, the perceived markers of difference 
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and/or antagonism.
Throughout this talk I stressed the complimentarity of the material and the ideational 
in the construction of communal mentalities and politics.  I illustrated this further by 
discussing the work of Hew McLeod and Harjot Oberoi on the same events: namely, the 
murder of six Muslim butchers in the Punjab in 1871-72 by members of the Kuka sect.  
In his explanation of Kuka millenarianism, McLeod’s stresses the role of rapid social 
change and the consequent discontentment among peasants and other rural service castes, 
leading to the Kuka religious reaction.
48
  Oberoi, on the other hand, emphasizes much 
more the crucial signiﬁcance of religious mentality itself, the actors’ ‘structures of con-
sciousness and experience’.
49
  He demonstrates that Kuka peasants viewed their chang-
ing social reality (that McLeod uncovers) through a certain religio-cultural framework. 
Oberoi’s intervention, however, should not be seen as superseding McLeod’s perspective 
but as deepening and enriching it.  Put more theoretically:
The major difference between discontent and unrest lies in the different interpreta-
tions given to the same objective situation and the chief source of these interpreta-
tions is ideologies.  The step from impulse to act is managed through the inter-
pretation of discontents in a way which makes social activism the most attractive 
way out. … However, although the acceptance of ideologies is a response to pre-
existing discontents, those discontents are also in part a reﬂection of pre-existing 
ideological beliefs’.
50
  
I concluded by showing why, despite all their differences, historians consider communal-
ism to be a modern phenomenon and by discussing the changes in communal ideologies 
and politics over the course of the twentieth century.
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In my ﬁrst lecture I had placed before the audience a problem for analysis with regard 
to communalism, namely, how can we write histories that recover the role of daily prac-
tices, discourses and sites in the making of this intractable phenomenon?  The second had 
introduced them to the literary and cultural reordering of Sikhism towards the end of the 
nineteenth century.  The third reassessed the Partition of India to explain why it has be-
come such a momentous marker.  In the light of the ﬁrst three talks, the fourth grappled 
with the problem of placing the historiography of communalism in perspective, so that 
we may be able to better understand that many-headed monster.  In this ﬁnal lecture, I 
commented on a variety of contemporary ethnic nationalisms, explored the similarities 
and differences between ethnic and civic nationalisms, and mulled over the possibilities 
hidden in the term ‘nationalism’. 
It goes without saying that communalism and nationalism can both converge and diverge, 
albeit we have seen more of the former in recent times.  The complexity of this relation-
ship interests me and this provided the raison d’être for the lecture.  I must, however, 
underscore that what I presented were ponderings, not a comprehensive treatment of 
contemporary ethnic disputes the world over or an exhaustive examination of Hindutva 
in late-twentieth-century India.
I began with a discussion of various long-term and contemporary factors that have 
gone into the making of present-day Hindu nationalism.
51
  I recounted how, since L. 
K. Advani’s notorious rath-yatra of 1989, the Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.P.) and its 
vanguard, the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (R.S.S.), and other accomplices attempted 
to unite Hindus internally while rabidly denouncing Muslims alongside.  This, I think, 
can be seen as an altered continuity of the Hindu Right’s strategy of putting together an 
integrated Hinduism, inaugurated by publicists in the earliest decades of the twentieth 
century.  Emphasizing how these parties use the cognitive categories and practices of 
religion to fuse notions of deshbhakti (devotion to one’s country) and Ramabhakti and 
to spew venom against Muslims who are projected as having desecrated Mother India’s 
inviolable body, the Temple-movement and the concomitant propaganda of the Sangh 
Lecture V
　　The Contemporaneous Ascendancy of Religious/Ethnic Nationalisms: 
　　Whither Civic Nationalism?
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combine were examined in detail.  At times Hindi nationalism and Hindu nationalism 
converge and serve each other to construct a cultural memory of a chaste Sanskritized 
Hindi as the ‘valid’ language of Hindus in the Hindi region.  Clearly, the Sangh’s nation-
alism is a majoritarian and authoritarian one where Hindus, under R.S.S. direction, will 
lay down the rules by which the minorities must abide.  Its version of Hindu culture is 
inextricably mingled with antagonism against the non-Hindu.
The social composition of this new, aggressive, Ram-centred communalism was analyzed 
to show how the greatest support has come from upwardly mobile business groups, the 
rich peasantry of northern and western India, and various segments of the urban and rural 
middle-classes.  Support and funds also keep pouring in from Hindus in America, Britain 
and elsewhere in what has been called ‘the foreign exchange of hate’.
52
  In its section on 
‘Communalism’, ZNet: South Asia Watch has documented the funneling of American 
money to various Sangh organizations.
53
  This has been happening, for example, through 
the activities of the India Development and Relief Fund (IDRF), a body that claims to be 
a non-sectarian one, presumably to dodge American government scrutiny since U.S. au-
thorities prohibit charities from granting funds to violent sectarian groups as also to earn 
the goodwill of the Indian diaspora as a ‘non-violent’ association committed to social and 
developmental work.
Illustrating my argument with numerous media reports of the recent Gujarat pogroms, I 
went on to show how contemporary Hindutva communalism has been more state-driven 
and minutely planned than ever before and how the Ahmedabad police has been abusing 
laws of arrest and detention to conﬁne an undisclosed number of Muslim men in prison.
Time did not permit analysis of other ethnic/nationalist conﬂicts in India.  Mentioning 
Kashmir briefly, I urged for a distinction between regional (or linguistic) movements 
seeking greater autonomy and lower-caste protests combating discrimination on the 
one hand and communal identities on the other.  The two should not be placed on the 
same footing, not with regard to India at least.  Nevertheless, in many discussions about 
national unity and integration/disintegration in India, the two are mixed up, sometimes 
deliberately, so that aspirations for regional autonomy and decentralization of the polity 
– much needed in my view – can be classed along with sectarianism as ‘disintegration-
ist’ by parties desiring over-centralization.
史資料ハブ／ＣＯＥ特別企画　連続セミナー
192
Should we think that religious/ethnic intolerance, violence, and genocide are South Asian 
specialties, we would be highly mistaken.  We only have to consider the savage conﬂicts 
in the erstwhile Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Russia, Quebec, Ireland, Kurdistan and Sri Lanka 
to realize that the name of the disease is ethnic nationalism.
54
  Warlords, guns, and fanati-
cism may be more visible in media reports about Iraq, Kashmir and Jaffna ,‘backwaters’ 
all, but the disease has torn Canada for thirty years, has affected the Ukranian-Russian 
relationship, has devastated Ireland for some seventy-ﬁve years, can still raise its ugly 
head in the American South and has always remained with Germany.  Turning more 
specifically to very recent sectarian or racial passions, I discussed a number of issues 
ranging from head scarves in Turkey and France to the continuity of White racism in the 
American South.
A comprehensive explanation of the resurgence of ethnic, religious and nationalist identi-
ties since the 1980s was beyond the scope of this talk.  Even so, I pointed to the role of 
‘globalization’ in all this and America’s imperial mess of the last few years, its military 
intervention in Afghanistan and more importantly in Iraq.  Relying on Michael Ignatieff, 
I also explored the psychology of ethnic and religious chauvinism in general.  Taking 
his cue from Freud, Michael Ignatieff has elucidated how protagonists internalize ethnic 
identity and why ethnic/religious nationalists, propagating ‘the narcissism of minor dif-
ferences’, are able to quickly mobilize chauvinisms across entire nations.  For so many 
of us Indians and Pakistanis, fervently desiring a stable, trouble-free people-to people 
contact between the two countries, this rings a very familiar bell.
I dwelt on the dubiousness of nationalist ideologies, immersed as they are in glorifying 
a collective self and often enough creating their opposites only to ridicule them.  Is not 
all nationalism secularized religion, a religion of the nation-state?  As Partha Chatterjee 
asks, whose imagined community is the nation?
55
  Whom does it serve?  Our misgiv-
ings today are not about a particular nation-state but about the historical character of 
nationalist thought in general for it must create its Others and cultivate intolerance, it 
must discipline and punish, demand unqualified obedience and loyalty.  Aggressive 
nationalism borders on the fascist.  For all these reasons, nationalism is viewed today as 
a ‘dark, elemental, unpredictable force of primordial nature threatening the orderly calm 
of civilized life’.
56
Yet, the recent contagion of ethnic/religious nationalism that has struck our world has 
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almost made us forget a very different tradition of nationalism: that of civic nationalism. 
The ideal of civic nationalism, aspects of which were ﬁrst developed in Great Britain, 
France and America in the eighteenth century, is based on a civic deﬁnition of belonging: 
shared attachment to democracy, parliament, rule of law.  Nationalism, we know, is a 
doctrine of popular sovereignty but this type vests sovereignty in all the people regard-
less of creed, race, colour, gender, language or ethnicity, seeks to create a community 
of equal rights-exercising citizens and defines nationhood in terms of citizenship, not 
ethnicity.  It is of course true that this conception of nationalism has not been fully real-
ized anywhere but that is because ideals by deﬁnition can never be fully realized.  It does 
not follow that the project of the civic, liberal, multi-cultural nation-state is so radically 
defective that we begin to see all nationalisms as inexorably leading to rabid nation-
worship.
The nation-state is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future.  As Benedict Anderson 
reminded us, even in communist societies, nationalism proved to be a more enduring ide-
ology than communist internationalism.  Why, then, leave the ﬁeld uncontested for ethnic 
nationalists to ﬁll the bottle – the nation-state – with poisonous wine?  Why not revisit 
the potentialities of the older civic and anti-colonial nationalisms?  As Ignatieff has so 
convincingly argued, we have to look to civic nation-states, committed to the rule of law 
and equal citizenship, to ﬁght the menace of ethnic conﬂict, to help nurture and protect 
cosmopolitan post-nationalism, to provide security and rights needed by us to lead our 
cosmopolitan lives as world citizens. 
57
  That is a paradox with which we must live – at 
least for the time being!
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